Showing posts with label modernism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label modernism. Show all posts

Wednesday, 21 April 2010

Paris



I've just come back from a few days in Paris, where I lived from 1990 to 1999. It can be hard to discuss one's perceptions of foreign places, because there's no other subject on which confirmation bias more acutely skews and finally devastates any attempt at rational debate. People build up from the culture around them a set of assumptions and beliefs about other countries or cities or peoples over a period of years or decades; they then go and visit the actual foreign place for a couple of days, and in practice don't have time to do much more than note confirmations of those stereotypes. The dominant English myth of France and Paris is overwhelmingly positive, to the degree that it constitutes what Orwell described as "transferred nationalism": considering France/Paris the flower of civilisation, culture, sophistication and beauty, the English tend to be fervent patriots for another country. They also tend to have a lower opinion of French politicians and their policies, but then French nationalists who are actually French share this bifurcation between a worship of "France" and a hatred of its current political elite. It's integral to the Francophilia that prevails in England that it should consider itself radical and non-conformist, proudly and individualistically going against the supposed grain of English Francophobia. In practice, England is absolutely packed wall to wall with Francophiles, each of whom fondly imagines him/herself a fearless rebel. This is reinforced by a tendency of the British media only to report on European news when there is violence involved (avalanches, train wrecks, terrorism, riots), or when it can be contrasted with Britain as a stick to hit the latter with. So we hear a lot about France's "cafe culture" as a superior alternative to British binge drinking; but we don't hear that road deaths in France are far higher than in Britain largely due to a greater social tolerance of drunk driving. As I found in the 1990s, anyone telling the English things about France that don't fit into their preconceived myths of a sub-Channel paradise is taking their life in their hands (figuratively speaking, on the whole).

Still, this is my blog, and I'd like to mention a few perceptions I had of Paris when I visited it this month. For one thing, I noticed that Parisians were considerably fatter than in the 1990s and much less well dressed. The first of these can be attributed to the recent and worldwide wave of obesity which, though it may have struck America and Britain hardest, will necessarily also hit everywhere else to the extent that it's caused by economic pressures. The second may be due to the globalisation of fashion standardising dress worldwide and thereby eliminating any local advantage; it wouldn't then be so much that the quality of Parisian style had relatively declined, as that it had become much the same as the dress anywhere else. The point here is that economic globalisation has changed Paris too; this is not Paris as mythical paradise but as another place in the same world (it has far more CCTV now, too).

More relevantly to the subject of this blog, the most startling perception I had was that the material substance of Paris, its architecture and look, had not changed at all. In Oxford where I live buildings are constantly being torn down and areas redeveloped; I was in London twice last summer and both times noticed how vastly different it looked to when I lived there in 1986-89, both through redevelopment and through cultural and social change. Paris, on the contrary, looked, at least in its centre, exactly the way it did when I arrived there 20 years ago; it seemed to be set in aspic. Many French expatriates I know would link this to the conservatism they now think typifies the country. The rhythm of change in France tends to be either non-existent or brutal, and just as central Paris was mostly and traumatically invented by Baron Haussmann in the 1860s, and just as it was revolutionised culturally in the 1950s-70s by the mass displacement of the white working-class (the people seen in Doisneau's photos and pre-war films) out of the city into the suburbs, and just as the city is periodically subjected to grandiose Presidential building projects, so Paris seems incapable of any kind of gradual evolution. Either total overhaul, or stagnation. And while Paris is certainly beautiful enough already not to need drastic reshaping, it looked to my eye shabby, dilapidated, in desperate need of some kind of rejuvenation.

Why does this matter for digimodernism? Because Paris was the undisputed home of modernism, and the slightly disputed home of postmodernism (it certainly provided the latter's theorists - see the Ecole Normale above - though most of the cultural and social developments were better exemplifed in America or Japan). In the late 19th century, when Haussmann's Paris was dazzlingly new, it provided the perfect backdrop for an all-new art; in the interwar years and even in the 1950s-60s the city offered museums full of the old culture while embodying an instance of the modern overthrowing the past which funnelled into revolutions of all kinds. Today, Paris seems like yesterday's city, a feeling reinforced by the post-1997 movement of hundreds of thousands of young French people to London and England as well as by the corresponding shift of so many middle-aged and elderly English people to France - demographic shift over the past ten years has constructed England as the location of energy and enterprise and France, to put it rudely, as the home of the clapped out.

Where then is digimodernism's home? It may well not have one; or rather, it may be integral to digimodernism that physical location is of minor importance. The epitome of this might be the message board, with its pseudonymous contributors posting their views via computers across the planet. Textually digimodernism is everywhere and nowhere, and it has no geographical centre. Visiting the capital of the 19th century (in Benjamin's description) and of most of the 20th brought this home very vividly.

Tuesday, 7 July 2009

What postmodernism isn't (or wasn't): part two








My phrase about "postmodernism" becoming some kind of intellectual black hole which sucks into itself all of the thinking and culture of the last forty years, like an insatiable and monstrous thought-mouth, reminds me of a joke (not a funny one really) that people used to make in the 1980s. It took this kind of form:


Person 1: "Ow!"


Person 2: "What is it?"


Person 1: "I've stubbed my toe!"


Person 2: "... That's so postmodern."


- Because everything was postmodern. Or, rather, everything that happened in the very recent past and present was postmodern. Or, rather, everything that happened in the very recent past and present to interesting, cool and hip types like ourselves was postmodern. Postmodernism, such an evil empire to a certain kind of evangelical Christian , was such a badge of cultural superiority to a certain kind of hipster.


Wikipedia's entry on postmodernism reads in part:


"The movement of Postmodernism began with architecture, as a reactionary movement against the perceived blandness and hostility present in the Modern movement."


The black hole beckons. If we are speaking of a "movement against", why not use the term "antimodernism"? If we agree that something called modernism exists, like America and clockwise movement, then surely antimodernism can exist along with anti-Americanism and anticlockwise movement? And I would certainly call a range of writers like Auden, Larkin, Orwell and Greene antimodernist - they were reacting against the experimentation and difficulty of Eliot, Joyce et al with a shift toward simplicity and tradition. And after them came writers (in Britain) like B.S. Johnson or Christine Brooke-Rose who went in another direction again, a postmodernist one.


Postmodernism has this drive toward an intellectual black hole because it operates on certain levels and in certain quarters - and very ironically - as a sort of grand narrative, a totalizing and complete description and explanation of the world. This is a fairly low, even trashy level of postmodernist discourse, but it palpably exists. Terry Eagleton's The Illusions of Postmodernism is aimed at it. When functioning in this manner it has a tendency, as grand narratives do, to see the world in binary terms as a battle of good and evil, with itself taking up the role of good.


Such a worldview is again beyond irony, for postmodernism emerged simultaneously with (but not quite coterminously with) deconstruction, which argued (in part) that language is composed of binaries but that we privilege one or other term (white over black, male over female) in a way which destabilizes the flow of meaning. It's unarguable that postmodernism frequently defines itself over and against modernism. Ihab Hassan (above) produced a pair of columns setting modernist and postmodernist characteristics against one another: "metaphor" against "metonymy", "transcendence" against "immanence" etc. Fredric Jameson begins his magnum opus with a comparison of a Van Gogh and a Munch against a Warhol. Binaries, pairs.
The assumption is then made, and the message is then transmitted, that:


(1) Postmodernism is the immediate successor to modernism. Nothing happened between them; we went straight from Woolf to Doctorow. (Dubious in the extreme.)

(2) Postmodernism is the equal of modernism: every Ulysses, Battleship Potemkin, Demoiselles d'Avignon or Waste Land has an equal postmodernist achievement in the field of the novel, film, art and poetry. (Arguable, but tenuous in the extreme.)


(3) Modernism is the only alternative to postmodernism. If the latter is the way we are now, the former is the alternative to it. Binaries imply a totality: if you do not fight for God, you fight for the devil, necessarily and with no other options; if you are not pomo, then you are modernist. (Nonsense for published postmodern theorists, but a pit into which students who are unversed in history and culture prior to 1890 all too often fall.)


(4) Postmodernism is better than modernism as a spiritual and/or moral and/or political and/or philosophical condition. As in deconstruction, we privilege one of the terms of the binary. This position is suggested by The Postmodern Condition and it is extremely attractive again to hipsters (if we can use the word) or anyone who wants to feel good about themselves. We are not a culture which is interested in the idea of being inferior to another time, as mass media texts from Pleasantville to Life on Mars unflaggingly repeat. Our temporal superiority complex is redoubtable. And so postmodernism gets identified with freedom and justice while modernism or modernity, we are told, are all about oppressive universals. I won't belabour this: on the Internet where the under-30s discuss postmodernism it is obvious that they consider it the equal of, the alternative to, and the clear superior of, modernism. Hence the hostility of some of them to the notion that it may be over.


My sense is that postmodernism had much that was good about it. It represented a redrawing of the cultural and political landscape to include many who had once been excluded or denigrated, with empowering and enriching effects. But it had serious drawbacks too. And in any case, it's a mistake to see postmodernism as a camp in a Manichean struggle against previous oppression. We are (or were) thrown into postmodernism; we are/were born and find ourselves floundering within it. It must be stressed that you will not find such assumptions in the writings of most postmodernist theorists. But those writings are disappearing into the past now (it's the 25th anniversary this year of "Postmodernism, or the Cultural Consequences of Late Capitalism", which is as far away from us as The Smiths' first album or the Soviet boycott of the Olympics). And what remains today is something of lower quality, more exposed and untenable. The great days of postmodern theory are long gone, and we are stuck in their dog days. Hopefully Digimodernism can be a ladder by which people can start to climb out.

More on this to come: metafiction; the blurring of high and low culture; and lots more besides.